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Abstract 
This paper investigates how patent applications and grants held by new ventures improve their ability 
to attract venture capital (VC) financing. We argue that investors are faced with considerable 
uncertainty and therefore rely on patents as signals when trying to assess the prospects of potential 
portfolio companies. For a sample of VC-seeking German and British biotechnology companies we 
have identified all patents filed at the European Patent Office (EPO). Applying hazard rate analysis, 
we find that in the presence of patent applications, VC financing occurs earlier. Our results also show 
that VCs pay attention to patent quality, financing those ventures faster which later turn out to have 
high-quality patents. Patent oppositions increase the likelihood of receiving VC, but ultimate grant 
decisions do not spur VC financing, presumably because they are anticipated. Our empirical results 
and interviews with VCs suggest that the process of patenting generates signals which help to 
overcome the liabilities of newness faced by new ventures. 
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1.  Introduction 
A critical endeavor of any entrepreneurial venture is to mobilize the resources necessary to build 
a successful company (Stinchcombe 1965). Entrepreneurs have to convince external resource 
holders of the growth potential of their company. Because the quality of a venture is often not 
directly observable, external parties have to base their decision on observable attributes that are 
correlated with the unobserved quality of the venture (Stuart et al. 1999). Observable 
characteristics may serve as signals when the prospects of young companies are being evaluated.  
We examine the role of patents1 as quality signals for VC financing. Patents are known to help 
companies to appropriate returns from investment in R&D, facilitate the commercialization of 
technology (e.g., Gans et al. 2002, Dechenaux et al. 2008, Haeussler 2008) and shorten time to 
IPO (Stuart et al. 1999). While some studies have shown a positive impact of the patent stock of 
high-technology companies on the amount of VC financing received (e.g., Baum and Silverman 
2004, Mann and Sager 2007, Hsu and Ziedonis 2008), on VC valuation (Lerner 1994) and on the 
likelihood of attracting a prominent VC investor (Hsu and Ziedonis 2008), a thorough 
understanding of whether and how patents support the venture in attracting VC at all, is still 
missing. 
In this study, we examine how the existence and “quality” of patents filed and held by young 
ventures influence VC decision making. By analyzing the informational content of patents, we 
are able to explore the role of the VC’s expertise in interpreting signals.2 This is an aspect of 
signaling that has not been studied before, although the effectiveness of the signaling mechanism 
depends crucially on the recipients’ ability to interpret the signal accurately (Heil and Robertson 
1991, Ndofor and Levitas 2004). We also examine the impact of patent examination and of 
reactions by rivals (opposition) on the VC’s funding decision. The patent system may create 
signals of startup quality at various stages of the patenting process. The role of the different types 
of “approval” received from the patent office has not been studied in earlier work. 
Based on the extant literature, we develop a set of hypotheses and then draw upon a unique 
survey dataset of 190 VC-seeking German and British biotechnology companies founded after 
1989. From the survey, we have comprehensive information on the technologies used by the 
startups and on the strength of their technological capabilities. Furthermore, we have also 
                                                           
1
 When we refer to patents, we include filed applications and patent grants under this term. Reference to either 
applications or grants is used when the distinction matters for our results. 
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 A definition of the term “signal” follows in section 2. We use the term “patents as signals” as a short-hand 
expression for any signals that may emerge from the patenting process, including the preparation of a patent 
application. 
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identified all patent applications filed and all patent grants received by these companies at the 
European Patent Office (EPO). We use data from the search reports of EPO patents to compute 
citation counts and to identify patents that may lack novelty and inventive step. Following a “pin 
factory” approach (see Borenstein et al. 1998), we complement our econometric results with 
information from interviews with VCs. The unique combination of survey data, official patent 
records and interviews strengthens the validity of our results. 
Our empirical analysis demonstrates that companies’ patenting activities have consistent and 
cogent effects on the timing of VC financing. Having filed at least one patent application reduces 
the time to the first VC investment by 76%. An increase of the application stock by one standard 
deviation is associated with a 50% increase in the hazard of obtaining VC financing. When we 
investigate the quality of patents, which we measure with received citations, we find that 
ventures with higher patent quality receive VC faster. This is important because the citations 
largely occur after the investment decision has been made, indicating that investors are well 
capable of distinguishing between patented inventions of low- and high-quality at an early stage. 
Conversely, there is only weak evidence that patent indicators generated by the patent examiner 
(e.g., assessment of the patent’s novelty and inventive step3) affect the hazard rate. Due to the 
investors’ ability to determine the quality of inventions from the information in patent 
applications, the final grant decision shows no additional effect on the time to VC financing. We 
also find that opposition events increase the hazard of receiving VC finance. Apparently, 
opposition by competitors is taken as a positive signal by VCs. We conclude (and confirm in our 
interviews) that VCs prefer to finance endeavors with high commercial potential, where 
oppositions are more likely to occur.  
Our study seeks to make two main contributions. First, we extend the literature by providing 
evidence that signals generated in the patenting process help to reduce informational 
asymmetries in the investor-entrepreneur relationship. We argue that patenting exerts a signaling 
function which helps to overcome the constraining effects of ventures’ liabilities of newness 
(Stinchcombe 1965). We document that patenting is important for the general VC investment 
decision and that they help firms to attract VC faster than would be possible without patents. 
Contrary to other studies, we do not simply focus on patents as binary signals, but elaborate on 
the process of patenting, on the information content of patents and the signal-reading ability of 
VCs. This allows us to gain insights into the venture’s ability to emit such a signal, but even 
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 The criterion of “inventive steps” used at the European Patent Office corresponds to “nonobviousness” as used by 
the USPTO. 
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more importantly, into the ability of the investor to interpret such signals. We find that VCs are 
capable of detecting high-quality patent applications long before the assessment is confirmed by 
citations or examination outcomes. This enhances the effectiveness of patenting as a signal-
generating process. This finding extends the literature on the “scout” function of VCs (Baum and 
Silverman 2004) by demonstrating that VCs are able to identify valuable technology with 
considerable precision. Furthermore, we find that a patent opposition boosts investors’ interest in 
the company. The signal “opposition” may be interpreted by the investor as evidence that the 
company is developing a technology of high commercial value (see Harhoff et al. 2008).  
Second, this research adds to the literature on the economic effects of patents. The classical view 
of patents asserts that patents foster incentives for innovation, but that they do so at the social 
expense of enhanced market power and the potential blocking of technological developments 
(Heller and Eisenberg 1998). Our results show that patenting also support the entry of 
entrepreneurial companies. As Hall (2007) has noted, patents may in this context be the source of 
a favorable welfare contribution, since they encourage innovation and the creation of new 
industries or the emergence of specialization in value chains. Our research suggests that patents 
do indeed constitute an attractive instrument which helps young ventures to overcome the 
liabilities of newness and, in turn, facilitates market entry while at the same time providing 
incentives for innovation. 
Our results have important implications for the practice of technology management and 
financing. For biotechnology ventures as well as for advisors and investors, the findings confirm 
that patents convey important information about the company and that they deserve considerable 
attention in due diligence processes. While preparing a patent application is costly and requires 
some disclosure of private information to the public, ventures should not underestimate the 
signaling value of patents as they help in acquiring funding and may also help keeping investors 
patient and enthusiastic about the venture.  
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
VCs need to make their investment decisions under a high degree of uncertainty. Technology 
start-ups are difficult to evaluate since they do not have a track record which outsiders can use to 
evaluate their potential, they are often years away from first revenues, their assets are mostly 
intangible and they are plagued by a high failure rate. These perils have led VCs to spend a great 
deal of effort in seeking and assessing signals of ventures’ growth potential (Amit et al. 1990, 
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Hall and Hofer 1993) and have driven entrepreneurs to undertake symbolic action to gain 
legitimacy (Zott and Huy 2007).  
The value of signaling lies in reducing information asymmetries (Spence 1973) as well as 
minimizing information costs (Long 2002). In general, the literature has identified three broad 
categories of signals that are relevant for technology-based startups. Signals of the first type 
include educational background as well as founder history (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990, 
Burton et al. 2002, Shane and Stuart 2002). The second group includes signals in the form of 
attributes of parties affiliated with a person or organization (e.g., Stuart et al. 1999). The third 
category includes previous accomplishments of the startup company. Patent grants and even 
patent applications may be considered such an accomplishment, signaling a company’s technical 
abilities. The value of signals generated during the patenting process is that they reduce 
information asymmetries between the VC and the new and unproven company seeking capital 
and that they minimize information costs for the financiers. Even a patent application which has 
not been approved yet by a patent office may constitute such a signal. The preparation of patent 
applications requires effort and time, since applicants have to follow strict guidelines and need to 
include technical information in a very structured manner. This allows individuals familiar with 
the patent application requirements to quickly assess the strengths and weaknesses of an 
invention and of the technology employed by the startup. While previous research has 
extensively elaborated on the first two categories, our study investigates whether patents are a 
meaningful signal in the entrepreneur-investor relationship. 
Patents as Signals 
We define a signal as a characteristic that is correlated with company performance, but is easier 
to observe than the underlying causal factors influencing performance.4 Patents generally fit this 
definition well. A patent is a voluntary, readily observable attribute of a patentee, which is costly 
for the patentee to obtain (Long 2002). This is particularly true for European patents which are – 
on average – 5 to 10 times more expensive than USPTO patents. The independent evaluation by 
the patent office may lend credibility to the patent as a signal; and credibility is a central element 
of how well a signal is received (Heil and Robertson 1991). Patents suggest that a company has 
developed its technology to a certain extent and that it has “defined and carved out a market 
niche” (Lemley 2001, 1505). Moreover, patents appear to have a causal effect – ownership and 
loss of ownership (e.g., in litigation) show a strong impact on the stock market value of 
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 We note that this is not the exact notion of “signals” used by Spence (1973) in his pioneering work where 
performance need not be correlated with the activity by which signalling is achieved. 
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companies (e.g., Hall et al. 2007). Hence, patents might act as observable indicator of the 
unobservable promise and quality of a venture’s technology in the presence of uncertainty.  
The relevance of patents for companies attempting to obtain financial resources, especially in 
their early stages, has previously been noted in the literature (Hayes 1999, Lemley 2000). A 
product that is proprietary or can otherwise be protected is an important selection criterion for 
VCs (MacMillan 1985). Hence, it can be expected that companies in need of capital will be 
informed about the potentially helpful role of patents and will try to obtain patents if the cost of 
doing so is not too high for them. 
Before we further discuss the role of the patenting process for generating quality signals, we 
need to point to the value of patents as property rights. Patents increase appropriability and thus 
provide incentives for innovation. In addition, patents facilitate the licensing of technology (e.g., 
Gans et al. 2002). They increase the attractiveness of companies as acquisition targets (Cockburn 
and Wagner 2007) and enable VCs to recover a salvage value from failing companies. However, 
scholars have also documented that “patent strength” varies between industries in such that in 
most industries patents are less featured than other means of protecting innovations, such as 
mover advantages or secrecy (Levin et al. 1987).  
While a large strand of literature has investigated the traditional view of patents as a means of 
protecting intellectual property, Long (2002, 625) notes that scholars have overlooked the 
informational function of patents which “may be more valuable to the rights holder than the 
substance of the rights”. Moreover, the information that is relevant to a financier may not just 
come from the grant event, but from other aspects of the patenting process. Recently, a few 
scholars have shed light on some aspects of the role of patents for VC financing. Hsu and 
Ziedonis (2008) find a positive effect of patents on investors’ estimates of company value for a 
sample of VC financed semiconductor startups. They find larger effects for early funding rounds, 
where information asymmetry is at its largest. In addition, patents are particularly valued by 
more prominent VC investors. Lerner (1994) also documents a positive influence of patents on 
company valuation. Mann and Sager (2007) investigate correlations between the availability of 
patents and performance indicators, such as number of financing rounds, total investment 
received, exit status, late-stage financing and longevity. Without taking the timing of events into 
account, they generally find positive correlations. However, having a patent before the first 
instance of VC financing is not significantly related to any of the performance variables. Baum 
and Silverman (2004) examine selection criteria used by VCs and subsequent company 
performance. They find a positive association between patent applications at the USPTO and 
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pre-IPO financing defined as VC financing and private placements. Patent grants also have a 
positive, but smaller effect than patent applications.5 
The existing literature has largely focused on companies with VC financing and on subsequent 
performance measures such as IPO, company profitability etc. Evidence on whether patents play 
a role in the initial selection decision of VCs is still scarce. Our hypotheses focus on the 
financing decision made by VCs and on the impact that patent applications, anticipated patent 
quality and revealed patent quality have on this decision. By distinguishing between anticipated 
quality (i.e., quality as revealed later in the examination process) and observable, i.e., revealed 
quality in our estimations, we can draw conclusions about the signal interpreting capabilities of 
the VC. This distinction will turn out to be important in our results. 
The Role of Patent Applications and of Application Quality 
Our most basic hypothesis presumes a relationship between the existence of a patent application 
and VC investment. We suggest: 
Hypothesis 1:  As startups file patent applications, the hazard of obtaining VC 
financing increases. 
This hypothesis serves as the starting point of our evaluation. The filing of patent applications 
may signal two aspects: first, that the startup has matured sufficiently to consider the commercial 
utilization of the technology it has been working on; and second, that it is willing to invest in the 
protection of its technology. Thus, a supportive result of this hypothesis is subject to various 
caveats. A clearer picture may emerge once the quality of the application is considered in more 
detail. Harhoff et al. (1999), among others, have shown that patent value has a very skew 
distribution with most granted patents being of little value. Hence, patents might signal that an 
innovation is novel, but not necessarily that it has commercial value. VCs will therefore have to 
evaluate the private value of a patent in order to assess the potential return from a venture 
investment. To do so, VCs will have to invest in their own signal-reading expertise (Heil and 
Robertson 1991) or, alternatively, they may hire external experts, such as patent attorneys, to 
evaluate the legal and technical foundations of a given patent application. In either case, the 
patent application may serve as a reasonably standardized format containing technical 
information on the startup’s invention. VCs will act as “scouts” in selecting companies (Baum 
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 While Baum and Silverman do not comment on this aspect, the use of USPTO data limits the study to applications 
that were ultimately granted, since publication occurs only at grant. Conversely, our EPO data allow us to trace 
unsuccessful applications as well as successful ones which became granted patent rights. 
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and Silverman 2004), and they will be more likely to make an investment if applications are 
anticipated to have high-quality. Thus, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2:  The higher the anticipated quality of a startup’s patent application, the 
more likely the startup is to receive VC financing. 
Revealed Quality and Third-Party Evaluation of Patents 
In the previous hypothesis we emphasize that VCs may be able to obtain a reasonably precise 
assessment of patent quality before that quality is revealed publicly. A public revelation may 
occur (i) when the search report is made public, (ii) when the patent is granted or (iii) when the 
patent is opposed. Besides relying on their own interpretation of the patent document, VCs can 
also base their decision on these objective evaluations within the patent system, but the 
associated delay in decision-making has negative consequences: the VC may lose the investment 
to another rival, or the pre-money valuation of the startup may increase. How this tradeoff is 
resolved is largely an empirical question. If the VC wants to take “official” information into 
account it can use information included in the patent office’s search report in which the examiner 
includes her view on the underlying prior art. This initial assessment is likely to affect the scope 
of the patent once granted, and it may therefore affect the financing descision (unless the 
information is correctly anticipated).  
Moreover, a granted patent will have a higher value to a VC than a mere patent application 
because the grant offers higher certainty concerning the scope and the strength of patent 
protection.6 However, if the VC has inspected the patent application and has come to a positive 
assessment with sufficient confidence, then the grant event is unlikely to elicit further actions by 
the VC.  
Information on the patent’s quality may also be revealed by opposition activity. In the first nine 
months after the grant of a patent, any third party can file an opposition at the European Patent 
Office. An opposition from a competitor can indicate that the company possesses especially 
valuable technology. If the technology were worthless, competitors would not bother to incur the 
costs of opposition (Harhoff and Reitzig 2004). However, an opposition also indicates that the 
patent faces a threat of revocation. The VC therefore needs to take a closer look to find out 
whether the patent will likely be upheld. An opposition can have a positive or a negative 
influence on the availability of VC. Since we are elaborating on the signaling character of 
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 Gans et al. (2008) argue that such uncertainties are important in practice. They find that the hazard rate for 
concluding a cooperative licensing agreement increases significantly after the patent has been issued, since the grant 
clarifies the patent’s claims. Note that certainty is never fully achieved, since the patent may later be challenged in 
litigation, or – at the European Patent Office – even earlier in opposition proceedings. 
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patents, we presume that a patent opposition signals the presence of a valuable technology to the 
VC. Statistically, the VC can expect that the patent is revoked in one third of the cases, while the 
opposition is rejected or the patent is maintained in amended form in the remaining two thirds of 
cases (Harhoff and Reitzig 2004).A natural corollary to our second hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 3:  The higher the revealed quality of a startup’s patent application, the 
more likely the startup is to receive VC financing. 
All of the three events considered for hypothesis three can be regarded as signals that are 
generated by a third party, i.e., the patent office and competitors, and might provide additional 
information on the actual value of a patent.  
 
3.  Field of Study and Data 
3.1.  The Biotechnology Setting 
The biotechnology industry provides an attractive setting for studying the impact of patents on 
the VC financing decision for several reasons. The R&D process in biotechnology is highly 
uncertain and complex, and companies need to access a broad range of human resources and 
capital. Among the capital resources, venture capital is often viewed as the key gatekeeper for 
ventures (Shepherd et al. 2000), facilitating the successful acquisition of additional resources 
(Stuart et al. 1999, Anand and Piskorski 2000). Furthermore, patenting activity is of particular 
importance in biotechnology. Cohen et al. (2000), inter alia, have shown that intellectual 
property rights are an important means for protecting innovation in the life sciences. Our 
investigation takes this function as given and focuses on the information content of patents for 
venture capital funding decisions. 
3.2.  Data Sources 
We study the role of patents for financing in the German and British biotechnology industry. 
After the US, these two countries are home to the largest number of biotechnology companies 
world-wide. Our database for this study draws from two data sources. First, we build on a survey 
conducted among German and British biotechnology companies in 2006. The survey population 
is composed of all companies active in the bio-pharmaceutical sector according to the OECD 
definition (OECD 2005). Companies not founded in one of the two countries or subsidiaries of 
foreign companies, and companies solely offering services or supplying products without 
conducting research were excluded from the sample. A population of 346 German and 343 
British core biotechnology companies was identified. Of those, 162 German and 118 British 
companies were successfully interviewed face-to-face with a preformatted and tested 
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questionnaire. The objective of the current analysis is to shed light on the role of patents for VC 
financing. Therefore we excluded companies that were – according to our survey responses - not 
interested in VC financing, either because they do not want to give up control of the company or 
they are not in need of VC financing.7 We thus have a homogenous sample of companies as basis 
for our analysis. Moreover, we only include companies that were founded after 1990. Our 
analysis is based on 116 German and 74 British companies that match our criteria and for which 
we have all the data needed to test our hypotheses. 87 of these companies received VC financing; 
103 did not. The second step was to compile data on all patents filed by these companies at the 
European Patent Office. We use information from an EPO patent database and from EPO search 
reports in order to operationalize our variables for the quantity and quality of company patents.8  
3.3.  Variable Definitions 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the time of first VC financing. The variable is 
measured on a quarterly basis. The last quarter observed in the data is 4/2005. The variable is 
coded as a dummy equal to one if the company has received VC financing and zero otherwise. 
Data on a company is right-censored if the company has not obtained VC financing by the date 
of the survey. 
The independent variables can be divided into patent related information and other company 
characteristics. All patent related variables are measured on a quarterly basis. The dummy 
variable patent application is equal to one if the company has applied for at least one patent in 
the current or in a previous quarter. We also investigate the influence of the number of patents a 
company has. Application stock is the cumulative number of patent applications filed at the EPO. 
For the empirical analysis we use the natural logarithm of the stock variable, since we assume 
that additional patent applications will have a decreasing marginal effect on the hazard rate.9 We 
increase the stock by one before calculating the logarithm in order not to lose observations for 
companies without patent applications. 
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 Companies might not be in need of venture capital, for example, when they follow a hybrid business model in 
which they provide service or supplier activities for third parties in order to finance their own R&D efforts. Another 
case would be companies that received a large amount of money, e.g., from business angels.  
8
 Sample selection bias may constitute a problem in our data. In our sample we did not account for companies that 
had failed and therefore exited the market. To rule out the possibility that this severely affects our results, we 
compiled a second data set with all German biotechnology companies founded since 1991. We observe companies 
that have gone out of business and companies still in business. The Online Appendix 1 presents the dataset and 
shows the results for the effect of patents on the likelihood of obtaining VC for companies that are still in the market 
as well as for companies that failed. From this calculation we learn that the core effects, i.e., that patents facilitate 
VC financing, are robust in both samples. The robustness in the effects of the patenting variable in the additional 
calculation greatly increases our confidence in our study and particularly in its contribution.  
9
 Biotechnology firms frequently file a set of secondary patents to safeguard the results of primary patents further. 
These secondary patents will not be as important to the VC as the primary ones. 
11 
As an approximate measure of patent we use the number of citations received by a given patent 
application. European patents undergo a rigorous examination process. If patents receive 
citations from subsequent patents (i.e., in the search reports for these subsequent patents), then 
they are presumably particularly relevant as prior art. Several studies have shown that there is a 
positive relationship between number of citations received and the private economic value of 
patents.10 Thus, average number of citations is defined as the total number of citations received, 
divided by application stock. We use the citation count to measure the impact of the VC’s 
anticipation of patent quality. Citations are counted from the publication of the application 
(which occurs 18 months after priority) for a period of three years, but we introduce the full 
three-year count from the filing date onwards. If VCs anticipate quality prior to its “official” 
confirmation, then this variable should have a positive impact on the funding hazard.  
We derive two measures of revealed quality from the search reports published by the European 
Patent Office. The prior art references in the search report are allocated to one of several 
categories. An X reference means that a claimed aspect of the invention cannot be considered 
novel or inventive, and that the claim may thus not deserve patent protection. We compute the 
variable X-Type references/application stock as the total number of X references divided by the 
application stock of the company. Applications with a high share of X references can be 
considered applications with low novelty or inventive step. Harhoff and Wagner (2006) show 
that such applications are particularly likely to be refused or withdrawn at the EPO.  
As a second measure of revealed quality based on search reports, we include an indicator for 
whether the invention builds on scientific breakthroughs. The impact factor of scientific 
literature gives the average impact factor of the journals that are cited as references to the non-
patent literature in the search report. It is therefore an indicator of the importance of the scientific 
underlying literature. Impact factors have been determined for the 120 most important journals in 
the area of biotechnology according to the ISI Citation Index.11 The indicators for novelty and 
for scientific importance are derived from information in the search report. These indicators are 
used in the analysis starting from the quarter in which the search report was published, since we 
use them as measures for revealed quality. 
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 See Harhoff et al. (1999), Harhoff et al. (2003) and Gambardella et al. (2008) using European patent citations. 
Jaffe et al. (2005), using USPTO citations, find a positive relationship between both the economic and technological 
importance of a patent as indicated by the inventor and the number of citations the patent received. 
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 In 31% of the referenced literature the patent examiner listed as the source not the journal name but the name of 
the database the article was downloaded from. In these cases we assumed an impact factor of one because we could 
not determine the real impact factor of the journal in which the article was published. Calculating the model without 
these articles does not change the sign or significance of coefficients.  
12 
The dummy variable grant is equal to one if the company has at least one granted patent. The 
variable share granted applications is the share of patent applications that have already been 
granted at the time of the respective quarter. These variables are used to test the impact of the 
grant information. 
Share of opposed patents is our fourth measure of revealed quality and indicates the share of the 
patent applications that received an opposition. It is calculated as the total number of oppositions 
received divided by the application stock. Oppositions are measured at the quarter in which they 
occur divided by the patent application stock in that specific quarter. 
The regressions also contain controls for company characteristics. All company characteristics 
are defined with reference to the time of founding. We can thereby exclude the possibility that 
company characteristics have been changed by the intervention of the VC. Technical capabilities 
proxies for the skill set of the employees. It is defined as the number of biotechnical methods a 
company is working with at the time of foundation, e.g., DNA, proteins and molecules or cell 
and tissue culture. Up to nine methods are possible. Years to market entry covers how many 
years the company thought to be away from market entry at the time of founding. Market entry is 
defined as achieving the first turnover with a product. Turnover due to selling of services is 
excluded. The variable has two interpretations. A larger value can indicate a higher demand for 
external financing, since the company needs to sustain a longer period of R&D. A larger value 
can also be a measure of uncertainty, since a longer time to market means that the technology is 
less developed and that the prospects of the company are more uncertain. 
Spin-out science is a dummy variable indicating that the company is a spin-out from a university 
or a publicly funded research institute. Spin-out company indicates a spin-out from a private-
sector company. The base category is independently founded companies. We also include 
controls for the founding period. We cover the periods 1990-1995, 1996-1999 and 2003-2005 
(founded ’90 – ‘95, etc.) with 2000-2002 being the base category – a time period of decline in the 
stock markets. German company is a dummy indicating that the company is based in Germany as 
opposed to the UK.  
Finally, the regressions include the number of early stage VC financings as a proxy for the 
supply conditions in the market for VC financing (early stage financings). The early stage 
financings are comprised of seed and start-up financings. Data for Germany is taken from the 
annual statistical publication of the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
‘BVK Statistik’ (BVK 2007); data for the UK is taken from the statistical publication of the 
British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association ‘Report on investment activity 2006’ 
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(BVCA 2007). The average number of early stage financings over the sample period 1990-2005 
is 401 for Germany and 307 for the UK. 
3.4.  Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show pronounced differences in the patenting activities of 
VC financed and non VC financed companies. The statistics are calculated for the first 16 
quarters (4 years) after founding. 69% percent of firms within the group of VC financed 
companies have at least one patent application, whereas this share is substantially lower, at 37%, 
for non VC financed companies. VC financed companies have a larger application stock. There 
are also differences in the characteristics of the patent portfolios. VC financed companies have 
portfolios of applications with a higher number of citations and a lower number of X references, 
indicating higher quality of patent applications with regard to inventive step and novelty. 
Furthermore, their patents build on scientific literature with a greater impact factor.  
The share of observations with at least one granted patent is also higher for VC financed 
companies, although at 9%, it is still quite low. The share of already granted patents is the same 
for both groups, but VC financed companies have a higher share of patents that received an 
opposition. 
The differences between VC financed and non VC financed companies are further explored in 
Figure 1. For all quarters after founding, VC financed companies have a higher average number 
of patent applications. But Figure 1 does not take the timing of the VC financing into account. 
Hence, it is not possible to deduce from the figure whether applications help companies to obtain 
VC or whether VC financed companies patent more. 
On average, companies apply for the first patent at the age of 1.3 years. For companies that 
obtain VC financing during the sample period, the first VC investment deal is closed five months 
later. Interestingly, the first patent grant is only obtained at the age of 4.5 years, shortly before 
market entry. This already suggests that actual patent grants may have only a limited influence 
on VC financing. The average company obtains VC financing long before the first patent is 
granted.  
Further differences in company characteristics are explored in Table 2. VC financed companies 
have capabilities in more technical areas and are further away from market entry at founding. 
Spin-outs from universities or publicly funded research institutions have a higher probability of 
being VC financed. However, the probability of VC financing is almost identical for German and 
British companies. Companies founded during or shortly before the boom period of VC 
financing (’96-’99) have a higher probability of obtaining VC financing. 
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4.  Multivariate Study 
4.1.  Methodology 
Using a proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates, we estimate the effect of a 
company’s patenting activities on the hazard of acquiring VC financing in a specific quarter. 
From the date of founding onward, the companies are “at risk” of a VC investment. To 
accommodate time-varying covariates, we split the complete time period into quarter-year spells. 
The hazard of obtaining VC financing is defined as the probability of obtaining VC financing in 
the current period given that no VC financing has been received up to the previous period. Our 
main interest is to investigate how patent related variables influence this hazard. The Cox 
proportional hazard model accommodates the influence of covariates by multiplying the baseline 
hazard by a function of observables. The hazard function itself is estimated non-parametrically 
and can take any form. Companies that have not received VC financing by the time of the survey 
are treated as right censored. 
4.2.  Empirical Results 
Our hazard rate results are shown in Table 3 and shed light on whether companies with patent 
applications or grants receive VC financing faster than those without patents. We observe 190 
companies for a total of 3001 quarters. Our estimation strategy is as follows. We present 
estimates from Cox proportional hazard models in which we include our patenting variables as 
well as control variables for founding years, economic environment and type of spinout. We also 
include two additional control variables based on our survey responses and demonstrate that the 
inclusion of these does not lead to reduced or less significant coefficients for our patenting 
variables.  
Column (1) shows results for a specification with a dummy variable for the incidence of any 
patent applications and a metric variable for the number of citations received. In the Cox model a 
positive coefficient indicates that companies receive VC financing faster, a negative coefficient 
means the opposite. The variable application (0/1) has a positive coefficient which is significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficient of the citation variable is significant at the 10% level. Moreover, 
our control variables for technical capabilities, years to market entry and early stage financings 
have the expected positive sign, but only two of them (technical capabilities and early stage 
financings) are significant, both at the 5% level. None of the other control variables have a 
significant coefficient in this initial specification. 
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In column (2), we add the application stock variable to the specification. The results clearly show 
that application stock is a better predictor of VC timing than the simple application dummy. This 
result is important since it confirms that the time variant stock variable matters in the Cox model 
while the (largely) time invariant dummy variable is not statistically relevant once the stock 
variable is included. We therefore maintain the stock of applications and drop the dummy 
variable in all other models. 
The results from column (3) provide first of all strong support for our hypothesis 1: an increase 
in the number of patent applications is associated with a reduction of the time to first VC 
financing. While the hazard estimate cannot be interpreted directly in terms of time, we also 
estimated a parametric accelerated failure time model based on a log-logistic distributional 
assumption (not shown in Table 3). Estimates from this model indicate that companies with at 
least one patent application obtain VC financing on average 78% faster than companies without 
patents. Increasing the patent application stock by one standard deviation (from 5.12 to 11.77 
patent applications) reduces the time to the first financing round by 50%.  
Moreover, the citation variable becomes significant at the 5% level in column (3): companies 
with highly cited patents receive VC financing faster than firms with infrequently cited patent 
applications. Thus, our second hypothesis also receives support. Citations are a measure that VCs 
typically cannot observe at the time of their decision. VCs are apparently able to differentiate 
between patent applications of higher and lower quality before an official assessment is 
available. These results support the view of VCs as a “source of selection” of companies (Baum 
and Silverman 2004). 
In column (4), additional variables describing the revealed quality of the application stock are 
introduced in order to test hypothesis 3: the number of X-type references/application stock, the 
average impact factor of scientific literature referenced in the search report, a dummy variable 
for the first patent grant – grant (0/1) - and the share of opposed patents. There is only weak 
evidence that the information in the search report matters for the timing of VC finance. A higher 
value of the variable X-type references/application stock indicates a lower degree of novelty 
and/or inventive step. The results in column (4) show that concerns about novelty and/or 
inventive step increase the time to VC financing, but the effect is only marginally significant at 
the 10% level. There is no evidence that companies whose patents build on publications in 
particularly prestigious scientific journals receive VC financing faster than applicants with more 
mundane patents. 
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The results also indicate that the grant information does not have any explanatory power – in 
column (4), the coefficient of the grant dummy is estimated very imprecisely. We cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that grants do not matter for the funding decisions. In order to ascertain that 
the latter result is not driven by misspecification of the functional form, we include in model 5 
the share of granted applications instead of the dummy variable. The result is again negative – 
grant-related variables do not impact the hazard of the financing event. This result confirms once 
more that VCs presumably anticipate most of the information about the quality of the venture’s 
patent applications prior to examination and patent grant. Due to the investors’ ability to 
determine the quality of inventions from the information in patent applications (see hypothesis 
2), the final grant decision shows no additional effect. 
In models 4 and 5, we also investigate the influence of oppositions. As the results show, 
companies receive VC financing faster if a higher share of their patent applications are opposed 
by third parties. Oppositions can indicate that the company possesses a valuable technology that 
competitors would like to use as well. Thus, the occurrence of an opposition informs the VC 
about the commercial potential of a patent. The effect size of oppositions is considerable. Taking 
the average portfolio with five applications, one opposition has the same effect as roughly 5 
citations. To summarize, the evidence for hypothesis three is mixed, in that not all dimensions of 
revealed quality have an influence on the financing decision. We find a rather weak influence of 
information from the search report, no influence of grants and a strong influence of oppositions. 
The latter result is probably due to the fact that oppositions cannot be anticipated as well as the 
quality of the patent application. The opposition event thus creates new information that is then 
taken into account in subsequent financing decisions. 
The results in column (6) test the possibility that the citation variable may dominate the influence 
of our variables derived from the search report. In that case, the variables X-type 
references/application stock and impact factor of scientific literature should have significant 
coefficients once we drop the citation variable. However, that is not the case – the results are 
largely unchanged. The X-type reference variable is marginally significant, but none of the other 
results change. Taking the specification in column (5) as our reference point, we find that the X-
type reference variable, the impact factor variable and the variable indicating the share of granted 
patents are even jointly insignificant (χ2=2.83 (3 dof), p=0.42). 
Some of the coefficients of our control variables in Table 3 are of interest in their own right. 
Since the results are fairly robust across specifications, we focus on the coefficient estimates in 
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column (5). Companies with a larger set of technical capabilities receive VC financing faster.12 
The variable years to market entry has a positive coefficient. Companies that have to undergo a 
longer development phase have a higher need for capital and presumably benefit more from the 
advice VCs give. The result can be an indication that VCs target companies where they can make 
a large difference. However, the coefficient is only marginally significant. Our control for the 
supply side conditions in the VC market, early stage financings, has the expected, statistically 
significant influence. The sample companies receive VC financing faster if more companies are 
financed in a given year. The additional control variables for type of founding, founding period 
and home country appear to be of no importance. That also applies to the country dummy - 
German and UK firms do not display different timing patterns. Even the interaction between the 
dummies application and German company turns out to be insignificant.13 An interaction 
between the dummy variable application and the age of the company measured in quarters is 
also insignificant. This latter result is also an indication that the proportional hazard assumption 
of the Cox model is justified. 
We also estimated additional specifications which included further control variables. Evidence 
by Hellman and Puri (2000) shows that more innovative companies have a higher likelihood of 
being VC financed. We controlled for the innovator strategy (i.e., how innovative the most 
promising technology of the company is) and obtained similar results to those in column (5). We 
do not use this control in the reported specifications, since it is measured at the time of the 
survey and thus might be influenced by the VC itself. Inclusion of a dummy for whether a 
company is active in the field of therapeutics did not reveal statistically significant results either. 
Finally, since the timing of information is important for identification of effects in our model, we 
performed a number of robustness checks.14 First, instead of computing the grant variables based 
on the actual grant date, we obtained information as to when the EPO informed the patent 
applicant about its intention to grant a patent. In none of these specifications did the grant 
variable become significant. Second, we took into account the granting dates of US patents. 
Many companies in our sample apply for a patent at both the EPO and the USPTO. For our 
sample period, the USPTO was known to grant patents faster on average than the EPO. See 
                                                           
12
 We experimented with a quadratic form for this variable to test for benefits of specialization, but found no 
significant influence of the squared term. 
13
 We also experimented with interaction terms of dummy application with years to market entry. We expected a 
positive coefficient since the patent signal could be stronger in environments with higher uncertainty, but found no 
significant difference. Similarly, an interaction of dummy application with a dummy for companies that have already 
achieved positive sales turned out to be insignificant. 
14
 The estimates described here are available upon request.  
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Harhoff and Wagner (2006) for details on patent examination lags. The USPTO granted patent 
applications which were equivalents to our EP patents after roughly 3 years whereas the EPO 
granted patents in our sample after 4.8 years. We ran additional regressions using the earliest 
grant date for patents applied for at both offices. We found a higher coefficient for the grant 
variable, but the influence of grants was not more precisely estimated. Third, we experimented 
with other patent indicators. We did not find a significant influence on the time to VC financing 
for the number of references (also separate for references to patent literature and references to 
non-patent literature), the share of references to non-patent literature, or the average number of 
claims. 
While these robustness checks support our interpretation of the estimates in Table 3, it is 
nonetheless worthwhile to discuss potential alternative explanations for our results at this point. 
Can we be sure that our effects are driven by the hypothesized patent signaling rather than 
unobserved differences between companies that happen to correlate with patents? One could 
argue that patents are just a sign that a company has reached a certain development stage. We 
address this issue by using several variables that control for differences in quality between 
companies. We have also restricted our sample to companies that have applied for VC financing 
and companies with R&D of their own. This should reduce the effect of differences in company 
strategy. In addition, patenting in the biotechnology sector comes very early in the development 
stage of products (e.g., in drug discovery and preclinical stage). Therefore, a patent does not say 
much about how fast a company makes progress in the development process. In addition, patents 
are costly. The costs for an EPO patent amount to about Euro 32,000.15 A rational company will 
only patent if it sees a benefit in doing so. In separate regressions (available upon request), we 
also show that dropping the variables which are most likely to be correlated with unobservables 
– our survey information on technical capabilities and time to market– does not diminish the 
coefficients of our patenting variables by much. We therefore conclude that the evidence in 
support of our signaling hypothesis appears to be fairly strong. But we go one step further 
towards validation and compare our interpretation to statements from venture capitalists. 
4.3.  Interview Evidence 
Econometric results alone are often not sufficient to distinguish between the traditional 
protection function of patents and their function as quality signals (Stuart et al. 1999, Hsu and 
Ziedonis 2008). Therefore, we have undertaken five in-depth interviews with VCs from 
Germany and the United Kingdom to complement our analysis in the “pin factory” tradition. In 
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selecting our interview partners we were interested in getting the views of different types of VCs. 
We have interviewed investment managers of early stage, late stage VCs and a corporate VC. 
The aim of these interviews was to gain insights into the importance of patents for the financing 
decision and detailed information on the patent due diligence.  
The first insight we gained from our interview partners is that both the protection and the quality 
signaling functions of patents are of great importance for VCs. One of the interviewees 
highlighted that “patent applications signal that companies have done their homework”. We also 
learned from our interview partners that companies are well aware of the importance VCs attach 
to patent applications and the importance of applying for a patent prior to entering into 
negotiations.  
Second, we were interested in learning from our interview partners whether patents are able to 
convey information at a relatively low cost. This potential advantage of patents has been 
mentioned in the literature (Long 2002, 647). Our interview partners suggested that patent 
documents offer information on the technology in a condensed and standardized format which 
helps in the due diligence process. Nevertheless, patent applications are often quite technical and 
formal and therefore difficult for VCs to read. To overcome this, they use highly specialized 
technical experts and patent lawyers to evaluate the patents. Patents may not reduce the costs of 
the due diligence process, but they provide precise information on the technology. 
Third, our interviewees indicated that the VCs evaluate patents and related documents very 
carefully, although there are considerable differences among VCs. One of our VCs gave us a list 
with 35 criteria on which hired technology experts in the field of the biotechnology firm should 
base their evaluation of the patent portfolio. Another interviewee said that they have no 
standardized patent due diligence. When asking about the relevance of information contained in 
the search report, we find a large heterogeneity among VCs. Whereas one VC appeared to be 
very interested in the information from the search report “(…) to see what the examiner thinks, 
to learn who is also working in this area and how the prior art limits the possibilities of the 
company under consideration”, another VC with similar size and investment focus rarely makes 
use of search reports. When we asked about the importance of the grant decision, we learned that 
patent grants are preferred but are not particularly important for the investment decision, since 
VCs “(…) are able to decide whether there is something valuable based on the patent application 
document”. In addition, VCs highlighted that, particularly in biotechnology, the picture that 
emerges from evaluating the entire patent portfolio is relevant, while the appraisal of a single 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15
 See http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/new/costs_ep_2005_de.pdf. (last download December 15, 2008).  
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patent is less meaningful. When shedding light on patent oppositions, our interviews revealed 
that an opposition signals to the VC that a third party is interested in the technology and, thus, 
that there is commercial opportunity. The opposition positively influences the financing decision 
when the patent is perceived to be strong or if the company is able to make commercial use of 
the third party’s interest, e.g., by licensing or selling the patent to the opposing party. The VC 
may abandon the investment opportunity if the commercial potential of the start up is severely 
endangered by the opposition.  
 
5.  Implications and Conclusion 
5.1.  Theoretical Implications 
Our paper provides contributions to several strands of literature. First, we extent a growing body 
of literature on entrepreneurial management by showing that patents help companies to 
overcome the liabilities of newness by facilitating access to external financial resources. While 
previous literature observed that VC financed ventures are more active in patenting compared to 
non VC financed companies (Kortum and Lerner 2000), it was left open whether this results 
from selection or nurturing. Our results provide evidence in favor of selection. While recent 
research has shown that investors pay attention to patent portfolios in their valuation decision 
(Hsu and Ziedonis 2008, Mann and Sager 2007, Lerner 1994), we show that the patenting 
process affects the financing decision.  
As a contribution to the signaling literature, we demonstrate that in the course of patenting, 
important signals are created which have impact on the venture-investor relationship. In contrast 
to other studies, we do not only focus on patents as binary signals but elaborate on the 
information content of the patenting process and the ability of the VC to read signals. Using 
citation counts, we find that the quality of applications affects VC behavior even before the 
quality is confirmed by outside parties. Our interviews confirm that VCs invest in their signal-
reading expertise by making efforts to stay informed about available patent information and by 
hiring external experts to evaluate the patent portfolios of potential investments. Moreover, the 
patent system can provide confirmation of whether the patent has commercial potential – being 
subject to opposition enhances the likelihood of receiving VC. However, we find only weak 
evidence suggesting that the patent examiner’s assessment impacts the financing decision of 
VCs. Nor does the ultimate grant decision have an effect on the financing decision. This result is 
not too surprising, given the long lags in the examination process at the major patent offices – 
VCs simply may not have the time to wait for approval by the patent office. Instead, they 
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evaluate the patent application themselves, anticipating the quality later certified by the patent 
office. Taking these results together, the role of patenting is rather complex – the patenting 
process itself generates information that is helpful to investors, but it is not simply the patent 
grant itself that is recognized by VCs.  
We also contribute to the literature on the economic effects of patents. Patents will typically be a 
barrier to entry. For example, Cockburn and MacGarvie (2007) find a lower entry activity in 
markets more affected by patent thickets. In addition, they report that companies operating in 
markets with denser thickets experience a delay in the first funding by external investors. Our 
results, however, suggest that the phenomenon is more complex: by facilitating entry of VC-
financed startups, patents also serve a pro-competitive role. For start-ups the patenting process 
generates valuable quality signals which help them to obtain funding. While this aspect has been 
discussed by some scholars (e.g., Hall and Ziedonis 2001), it still deserves further attention. 
5.2.  Practical Implications 
Besides extending the scientific literature, our results have important practical implications for 
management and public policy. We show that patent documents are effective instruments for the 
transfer of information. Ownership of patents (or patent applications) is associated with faster 
acquisition of VC. Thus, investing in intellectual property will effectively support startup 
founders and managers to overcome the liability of newness. Our detailed analysis on how 
various patenting events and metrics affect the VC investment decision provides crucial insights 
for companies interested in obtaining VC. Faced with resource constraints, start-ups often have a 
choice between pursuing patent grants or investing in additional applications. Our results suggest 
that improvements to the application stock and its quality are of particular relevance for VC 
acquisition purposes. Naturally, patent grants will matter for obtaining actual protection, but they 
do less so for the raising of capital. These results can also help to shape the patenting strategy of 
start-up companies. Firms often need to determine the optimal time for submitting a patent 
application. Refining the application prior to filing may yield broader scope and better 
protection. Delaying the filing may raise the danger of being pre-empted by rivals. We find that 
the trade-off also applies in the context of raising VC – both quantity and quality matter. The 
patenting strategy of a start-up should be a task for the top management as it can be of crucial 
importance for the further development of the company. Our results have also implications for 
VCs who can make use of patents in order to learn about the start-up’s technology. Our results 
show that VCs tend to anticipate patent quality. Some VCs may profit from making further 
investments in this capability and should invest in their patent reading ability.  
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With regards to public policy, this study implies that the role patents serve is rather complex. 
Patents may reduce information asymmetries between financiers and founders, and they may 
therefore positively influence market entry by start-ups. This finding points to an important 
economic role of the patent system which is not yet reflected in the current debate on the 
“optimal” patent system but should not be ignored. Second, our findings point to a discussion on 
how the signaling role of patents can be actively promoted. The challenge for patent offices is to 
think about how patent information can be provided faster and in a clearer form such as to enable 
firms with high-quality technologies to receive financing faster. 
5.3.  Limitations and Future Research 
Various caveats need to be taken into account when considering our results. First, there is a 
question of external validity. This study investigated the importance of patents for obtaining VC 
financing in one industry. It would be interesting to know whether the revealed effects are also 
present in industries other than biotechnology. In biotechnology, patent protection plays a very 
important role (Cohen et al. 2002). Whether the signaling role of patents differs in importance 
from industry to industry is not clear from previous findings. Mann (2005) suggests that the 
importance of patents for the financing decision varies by sector with the software sector, for 
example, exhibiting an unusually low importance of patents. Hall and Ziedonis (2001, 110) study 
the patenting behavior of ventures in the semiconductor industry and find that one of the most 
important roles of patents appears to be “securing capital from private investors in the start-up 
phase”. Furthermore, Arora et al. (2008) document that the patent premium is high in industries 
like drugs, biotechnology and medical instruments and low in industries like electronics. It is left 
to future research to determine how strongly these effects are influenced by the signaling role of 
patents. A second issue concerns potential omitted variable biases. Previous research has shown 
that affiliations with prominent partners are important quality signals (e.g., Stuart et al. 1999; 
Hsu 2006). Ideally we would like to control for these quality signals in our analysis, since it is 
possible that these signals are correlated with patenting. Unfortunately, our survey data does not 
include information about the prominence of a company’s affiliates and it is not possible to 
obtain this information from publicly available data sources. 
Given our results, it seems particularly promising to explore how investors structure their due 
diligence processes in order to decipher signals as fully as possible. In this project we have 
conducted interviews with only a handful of companies, so we cannot draw conclusions 
regarding institutional differences in patent due diligence. Nevertheless, we think that it would 
be a worthwhile endeavor to conduct a large scale study. We found evidence that patenting 
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functions as an important signal-generating process for obtaining VC finance. It would also be 
interesting to know how costly it is for companies to generate the signals, and to separate the 
value of the signal from the value of the exclusion right. We leave these questions to be explored 
in future research. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Time-Variant Patent Variables 
  VC financed firms Non VC financed firms Diff. mean 
Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Obs Mean St.Dev. p-value 
application (0/1) 1411 0.69 - 1595 0.37 - 0.000 
grant (0/1) 1411 0.09 - 1595 0.05 - 0.000 
application stock 976 5.12 6.65 584 3.32 3.45 0.000 
average number of. citations 976 1.54 3.33 584 0.87 0.92 0.000 
X-type references/application stock 976 0.91 1.07 584 1.33 1.40 0.000 
X-type references/claims 976 0.06 0.08 584 0.08 0.10 0.000 
impact factor of scientific literature 976 1.71 3.26 584 0.54 1.50 0.000 
share granted applications 976 0.04 0.15 584 0.04 0.14 0.944 
share opposed patents 976 0.01 0.05 584 0.001 0.01 0.002 
Note: The statistics refer to the first 16 quarters after founding. # The statistics are given for companies with at least 
one patent application. For the dummy variables the last column shows the two-sample test of proportion. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Time-Invariant Control Variables 
  VC financed firms Non VC financed firms Diff. mean 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev. p-value 
technological capabilities 87 2.16 1.31 103 1.69 1.04 0.006 
years to market entry 87 5.37 3.88 103 3.96 3.57 0.009 
spin-out science (0/1) 87 0.61 - 103 0.53 - 0.297 
spin-out company (0/1) 87 0.06 - 103 0.12 - 0.156 
independently founded (0/1) 87 0.33 - 103 0.35 - 0.793 
German company (0/1) 87 0.63 - 103 0.59 - 0.574 
founded ‘90 - ’95 (0/1) 87 0.09 - 103 0.14 - 0.345 
founded ‘96 - ‘99 (0/1) 87 0.39 - 103 0.23 - 0.019 
founded ‘00 - ’02 (0/1) 87 0.46 - 103 0.49 - 0.627 
founded ‘03 - ‘05 (0/1) 87 0.06 - 103 0.14 - 0.073 
Note: These variables are time-invariant, therefore one observation is available per company. For the dummy 
variables the last column shows the two-sample test of proportion. 
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Table 3: Cox-Hazard Models 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
application (0/1) 0.597** 0.042     
  (0.240) (0.381)     
ln application stock  0.396** 0.413*** 0.601*** 0.537*** 0.564*** 
  (0.200) (0.126) (0.176) (0.154) (0.152) 
average number of citations 0.037* 0.041* 0.042** 0.038* 0.039*  
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)  
X-type references/appl. stock    -0.286* -0.271* -0.276* 
    (0.166) (0.164) (0.164) 
impact factor of scientific lit.    -0.076 -0.065 -0.065 
    (0.116) (0.114) (0.115) 
grant (0/1)    -0.302   
    (0.459)   
share granted applications     0.035 0.007 
     (0.956) (0.969) 
share opposed patents    9.369** 8.401** 8.676** 
    (3.726) (3.581) (3.585) 
technical capabilities 0.219** 0.187** 0.186** 0.173** 0.172** 0.167* 
  (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) 
years to market entry 0.0449 0.047 0.047 0.052* 0.0514* 0.0504* 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
early stage financings 0.0011** 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0013** 
  (0.006) (0.0006) (0.006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
spin-out science -0.0932 -0.131 -0.132 -0.165 -0.185 -0.216 
  (0.248) (0.250) (0.250) (0.256) (0.257) (0.253) 
spin-out company -0.399 -0.522 -0.526 -0.568 -0.585 -0.629 
  (0.491) (0.496) (0.494) (0.495) (0.497) (0.495) 
founded '90 - '95 -0.459 -0.480 -0.483 -0.720 -0.715 -0.680 
  (0.454) (0.459) (0.458) (0.496) (0.495) (0.495) 
founded '96 - '99 0.191 0.168 0.165 0.158 0.123 0.165 
  (0.253) (0.254) (0.252) (0.260) (0.256) (0.253) 
founded '03 - '05 0.132 0.163 0.167 0.146 0.135 0.113 
  (0.497) (0.498) (0.497) (0.498) (0.499) (0.499) 
German company -0.110 -0.099 -0.097 -0.168 -0.172 -0.155 
  (0.276) (0.278) (0.277) (0.284) (0.286) (0.285) 
Observations 3001 3001 3001 3001 3001 3001 
Chi2 33.6199 37.3574 37.3451 45.1678 44.7227 42.2897 
log likelihood -406.9 -405.0 -405.0 -401.1 -401.3 -402.5 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients, not hazard ratios shown.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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 Figure 1: Quarterly Patent Applications by Company Type 
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Online Appendix 
Appendix 1. Robustness Check Selection 
We compiled an additional data set to check for the robustness of our results with regard to a possible 
selection bias. This calculation is based on information on all German biotechnology companies that were 
founded after 1990. The information is obtained from Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating 
agency. We restricted the sample to biotechnology companies with a focus on human biotechnology and 
excluded companies that are only active as suppliers, service companies or consultants. The Creditreform 
database contains basic company level data such as number of employees, legal form, industry and 
ownership structure, and other information usually gathered by credit rating agencies. 
We identified 543 biotechnology companies, of which 142 had already gone out of business. Companies 
are deemed to go out of business if they end their activities involuntarily (bankruptcy) or voluntarily. 
Companies that were taken over by other companies are not counted as closures if their legal entity was 
not deleted. For over 95% of the closed companies, going out of business was not related to a take-over. 
Whether a company received VC investment or not is established from the ownership structure 
information in the dataset. 112 companies in the sample received VC financing; 37 of these are already 
out of business. 61% of the VC financed companies had applied for at least one patent at the time of 
financing. Companies with applications have, on average, applied for 4.3 patents (median 3) at the time of 
financing. The mean size at foundation is 8.9 employees (median 2). 
Table A1 displays the results from the time-to-VC financing models. A time period comprises six months. 
Model (1) and (3) include only companies that are still alive whereas models (2) and (4) report the results 
for the companies that went out of business. The results suggest that the patenting activities (at least one 
patent in models (1) and (2) as well as the application stock in models (3) and (4)) reduce the time to first 
VC financing for companies that are still alive as well as for companies that have already failed. The 
similar results for both company groups give us confidence that the results of our main data set are not 
distorted by selection bias.  
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Table A1: Hazard Models – Alternative Data Source 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Cox Cox Cox Cox 
Sample alive dead alive dead 
application (0/1) 1.810*** 1.208***     
  (0.249) (0.351)     
ln application stock     0.771*** 1.162*** 
      (0.115) (0.239) 
ln employees 0.053 0.032 -0.023 -0.011 
  (0.088) (0.146) (0.091) (0.144) 
early stage financings 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
founded '90 - '95 -0.763 -1.619* -0.680 -1.451* 
  (0.556) (0.849) (0.558) (0.837) 
founded '00 - '04 -0.098 0.396 0.051 0.328 
  (0.285) (0.405) (0.288) (0.408) 
Observations 4744 1409 4744 1409 
Firms 401 142 401 142 
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.16 
Chi2 95.58 45.99 77.00 54.71 
Log likelihood -372.3 -148.3 -381.6 -143.9 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients not hazard ratios shown * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
